Weaknesses of the international engagement

The International Community, personified in institutional actors,²⁰ in mixed authorities (such as the Constitutional Court and the Human Rights Chamber), and in a large number of non-governmental organisations, has invested a great deal in the civil implementation process, which cannot be measured solely by money.²¹ However, the implementation process was in no way facilitated by the international actors, as their fields of activity often overlapped to a great extent and, unfortunately, they were completely uncoordinated and unharmonised; additionally their mutual struggle to justify their very presence in the country has in no way facilitated the implementation process.²²

Ever since the era of High Representative Petritsch, the International Community has tried to withdraw and to remove the decision-making of a foreign factor, the effects of which (dependency on foreign donors, shifting responsibility for “unpleasant decisions” to international organisations, lack of democracy etc.) have been earlier cautioned against.²³ First and foremost, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s officials should have shifted responsibility to their own cause, under the motto of “ownership” regarding the peace implementation process.²⁴

Consequently, the “Partnership forum” was set up in order to promote cooperation between the Council of Ministers, the civil sector and the High Representative.²⁵ By means of “streamlining” it should have acted against the “institutional overkill” of the international assistance organisations,²⁶ and, in general, shaped the international assistance more efficiently while remaining budget-conscious.²⁷ After a temporary relapse in terms of returning to this practice with elements of a foreign protectorate under Ashdown, who had to initiate great reforms with three nationalistic political parties (HDZ, SDA and SDS), his successor, Christian Schwarz-Schilling, by imposing a moratorium on the Bonn powers,²⁸ was unsuccessful at attempting to make the national officials (re)assume responsibility and show political maturity. His successor Miroslav Lajčák faced a delicate task of reaffirming the authority of his powers in the interest of stabilisation, thereby not falling into the trap of protectionist care again. The present High Representative Valentin Inzko inherited Lajčák’s problems. In addition, Inzko was charged with a task whereby the State was required to fulfil as soon as possible two conditions and five objectives of the Peace Implementation Council in Bosnia and Herzegovina from February 2008 in order for the Office of the High Representative to be closed, and in order to define at the same time new relations between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the European Union.²⁹