Unity without consensus

The contradiction of political unity without consensus, which was very clearly observed by Alefsen, is apparent in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s post-conflict politics. It is a result of compromise forced in Dayton; the price for survival of a multi-ethnic state, which was necessary in order to not legitimise ethnic cleansing, and to not send the wrong signal to areas in the region with a similar ethno-political situation and to the Soviet Union, which was falling apart.¹³ A great obstacle for stabilisation of the country is the lack of preparedness for consensus. Groups not favouring a joint state, through constant delays and inhibition of the decision-making process, are trying to prove that such a state is dysfunctional. Reckless statements coming from diplomatic circles on “establishing new borders in the Balkans” encourage them in doing so. The Serbian side has again recently put on the agenda the issue of a new system of the state, thereby linking the decision on the final status of Kosovo and the continuation of the Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹⁴ In that context, the proposed referendum in the Republika Srpska has caused significant political tensions. Where the areas of responsibility are not separated in the very Constitution – as is the case between the two Entities – attempts were made, beyond the constitutional framework, to establish independent representation of certain ethnic groups by setting up parallel institutions. This brought into question all “supra-ethnic structures” at the State, Entity and Cantonal levels. Unlike the warring sides after World War II, when each country had a chance to tackle reconstruction on its own, only to agree, seven years later, being driven by reason, on strategic cooperation within the European Coal and Steel Community, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s warring sides immediately went together aboard the same “ship”, the sinking of which would be acceptable for at least two out of the three of them.¹⁵ Overcoming the past through criticism, which is necessary for the common future of peoples, proved a tough

endeavour, since the peace agreement failed to name losers and culprits.¹⁶ Also, no side is willing to show that it recognises injustice. From a practical point of view, the only form of overcoming the past in the first years after the end of the conflict was the activity of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).¹⁷ This leading role for prosecuting war crimes in the country was taken over a few years ago by the Special Department for War Crimes of the Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina¹⁸ since the Entities’ lower instance national courts had tackled that problem area indecisively and insufficiently.¹⁹