Double transition

Bosnia and Herzegovina has experienced a double process of transition: on the one hand, from armed conflict towards lasting peace as a post-conflict society and, on the other hand, development from moderate authoritarian socialism towards a free democratic state and market economy.

Since the entire territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina was caught up in war and the neighbouring states were involved, practically speaking, the entire population of Bosnia and Herzegovina was a victim. Other than the dead and the wounded, the armed conflict saw mass expulsions and large parts of the country were ethnically “homogenised”, meaning that an otherwise well-functioning multi-ethnic society was split. The “brain drain”, which had started during the conflict, continued in the subsequent years due to a lack of economic prospects, despite improvement in the security situation. Practically, the economy did not function. An army of the unemployed, victims of the conflict and retired persons have put a strain on the State treasury ever since. Considering the goal of achieving sustainable stabilisation of the country, what poses a particularly serious problem is the fact that, despite the rightfully sealed survival of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a multi-ethnic State in Dayton, possibilities still exist for conflict to break out. Nationalistic groups had already used such potential in the past, and such potential for conflict was refreshed by memories of a traumatic ethnic conflict in the recent past. The State of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which had been weakened during the conflict, was completely stripped of its legitimacy and institutions. The reason behind such a position was the concentration of State power, which came into being during the armed conflict, on ethnically determined territorial units. In a state which is not wanted by at least two of its constituent peoples, joint institutions could barely operate.

Transition towards democracy, protection of human rights and a market economy, owing to the destructive armed conflict, is hard to implement and is conditioned by three aspects. Firstly, the reform of a destroyed economy is a challenge per se. Secondly, necessary measures are hard to implement in a political climate full of obstructions and inconsideration. Finally, the armed conflict made a large proportion of the population, including the ruling circles, fail to realise that the country is in this sad situation not only because of the armed conflict, but also because it is conditioned by the very system in the country. After decades of non-alignment and non-affiliation with any of the blocks, throughout which Yugoslav socialism had generously supported both the East and the West, and an average citizen enjoyed a certain living standard and privileges that had been almost non-existent in the countries of the East Block, a great many people are nostalgic about the pre-war times, and are unable to comprehend the real meaning of reform leading towards a market economy. Authoritarian “master minds” and the system of Communist Party nomenclature¹⁰ further consolidated themselves during the years-long conflict, and were adapted by the nationalistic parties to their goals and turned into instruments as such. The effect of this is that the ethnic collective interests had suppressed the interest of the individual – who, anyway, has always come after the public interest – to third place. In that sense, Alefsen¹¹ justifiably observes the lack of division of power, as police and judiciary are distinguished by ethnic loyalty, so that, for instance, war criminals remain unpunished and returnees from other ethnic groups unprotected. A lack of human rights based culture and civil society, as well as weak pluralist media and lengthy political tensions in neighbouring countries, additionally hinder changes.¹²