General remarks

Pursuant to Article XI.1(b) of Annex 6, the Chamber could order the steps to be taken by the defendant in favour of the applicant whose rights and freedoms had been violated. The Chamber could, for instance, order one to cease and desist from certain activities, payment of monetary compensation (monetary relief) both for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage, and impose temporary measures (pending the enforcement of a decision on admissibility and merits). These powers of the Chamber significantly exceeded the powers of the European Court under Article 41 of the ECHR. Namely, under the said article, “a just satisfaction” in the best case scenario may constitute monetary compensation.³⁷⁰⁶ However, thanks to its special mandate prescribed by Annex 6 of the Dayton Peace Agreement, the Chamber reacted in an increasingly clear and precise manner to the established violations of human rights and freedoms, and ordered that the defendant act positively in order to exercise as best as possible a legal remedy in the event of a violation.³⁷⁰⁷ Also in this case, the implementation on the spot proved an advantage. Unlike the BiH Constitutional Court, the Chamber, nevertheless, could not independently declare laws null and void, or quash court judgments, but only order the responsible defendant to undertake administrative, judicial or legislative steps in order to provide assistance to the injured party in a situation where human rights or freedoms had been violated.³⁷⁰⁸ Under the rule, the Chamber was limited to assisting an individual appellant, and avoided issuing measures and orders with far-reaching impact. Accordingly, for instance, in the case of Zahirović, despite finding that the court deliberating on the appellant’s civil action was not independent within the meaning of the ECHR, the Chamber only ordered that it was necessary to provide court protection to the applicant before an independent and impartial tribunal.³⁷⁰⁹

The Human Rights Commission within the BiH Constitutional Court partly ordered the enforcement of measures exceeding the case at hand, particularly in procedures which were in some way examples of general and systemic violations of human rights and freedoms. Accordingly, for instance, it ordered that a law violating standards of human rights and freedoms be amended,³⁷¹⁰ or even to do so with the specific contents of the laws necessary to regulate a legislative area that has been insufficiently regulated up until that point.³⁷¹¹