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AP 1426/05 Menzilović et al.

20061109

AP 218/04 D. N.

20041027

AP 30/03 R. R.

20040423

AP 321/04 N. Đ.

20050217

AP 471/04 H. T.

20041027

AP 852/04 M. A.

20041027

AP 862/04 Pavlović

20060314

AP 96/02 Ivanović

20040317

U 10/03 PP “Gana” Teslić i G. G.

20040323

U 18/00 Hajdarević

20021019 OG of BiH, No. 30/02

U 58/03 Z. C.

20040326

According to Article 16, paragraph 1 of the applicable Rules of the Constitutional Court of BiH, the time limit to file an appeal is 60 days. In the event that the 60th day is a Sunday, the appeal may be filed the following day.2954 The time limit is of preclusive nature and cannot be extended. So an appeal which has been filed after the prescribed time limit, if only of one day, shall be treated as an appeal which has been filed much after the expiry of the time limit.2955

The 60-day time limit applies both to an appeal and the supplement to an appeal. As to the submission of new facts, this rule does not apply if they are submitted within a time limit of 60 days after that party was informed of the fact. Furthermore, a timely filed appeal does not stay the 60-day time limit, since that time limit may not be regarded as a time limit to announce the appeal (Beschwerdeankündigung). Therefore, the 60-day time limit serves to prepare the appeal on a point of fact and law and to deliver it.2956

Taking into account the legal system, the time limit to file an appeal depends also on the requirements for the exhaustion of effective legal remedies. In particular, the time limit starts running on the date of the delivery of the decision on the final legal remedy used, within the meaning of Article 16, paragraph 1 of the Rules of the BiH Constitutional Court, whereby a particular case is completed.2957 Therefore, it is necessary to establish in every particular case which legal remedies can be regarded as “effective” and whether they have been exhausted. The 60-day time limit may be determined based on this.2958

It follows from the aforementioned reasoning that a decision on an “ineffective” legal remedy cannot be regarded as the restarting point of the 60-day time limit.2959 Quite the contrary applies if the appellant, in accordance with the law, is denied the first-instance proceedings which would enable him/her to challenge an administrative act.2960 In that case, it would be logical that a court decision (mostly a ruling), whereby an action against a general act has been rejected for lack of jurisdiction, does not stop the 60-day time limit from running. Therefore, an action brought to the Court based on the law itself is a manifestly inadmissible legal remedy, which is the reason why it could not be considered effective.2961 However, in that case, the appeal may be regarded as an appeal of the deprivation of judicial protection. It is not primarily directed against the challenged administrative act but against a court decision whereby judicial protection has been denied in an unconstitutional manner.2962 The 60- day time limit starts running again at the moment of its delivery. In that case, ordinary courts, by directly applying the rights and freedoms under the ECHR, would have to allow the use of a legal remedy regardless of the restrictions prescribed by the positive regulations. In Case No. U 19/00, the Constitutional Court, in accordance with this conclusion, ordered the Supreme Court of the Republika Srpska to declare an action admissible and to take a decision on the merits of the case.2963

Therefore the appellant can be required to exhaust only the effective legal remedies. The appellant bears the burden of proving that a legal remedy is not effective. If the Constitutional Court finds that a legal remedy is not effective, but despite this fact the appellant pursues it without a successful outcome, the decision on such a legal remedy does not interrupt the running of the time limit.2964 It follows that in general the appellant bears the consequences of its own wrong assessment of the effectiveness of the legal remedy used, unless his/ her assessment constitutes an “excessive burden imposed on the appellant”.2965

As a rule, the time limit is determined through a delivery slip. If the appellant refuses to sign the delivery slip on the so-called final decision (with the purpose of manipulating the time limit), that day shall nevertheless be taken as the starting date.2966 If it is impossible to determine the date of delivery of the final decision, the time limit shall start running on the date or moment when the appellant was informed of the violation of his/her rights.2967


Footnotes

  1. AP 862/04, paragraph 9 et seq.

  2. AP 321/04, paragraph 6; AP 852/04, paragraph 3; AP 471/04, paragraph 3.

  3. AP 1426/05, paragraph 27.

  4. U 16/01, paragraph 11.

  5. Fore the foregoing details, see “c. Exhaustion of legal remedies”, p. 702.

  6. Ibid.; U 8/01, paragraph 2.

  7. U 10/03, paragraph 13 et seq.; U 58/03, paragraph 16 et seq.; U 19/00, paragraph 18.

  8. U 19/00, paragraph 17.

  9. Ibid., Article 18.

  10. U 19/00, paragraph 40.

  11. AP 96/02, paragraph 11.

  12. U 18/00, paragraph 40.

  13. AP 218/04, paragraph 5.

  14. AP 30/03, paragraph 3 et seq.

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