Legal acts of the High Representative (Annex 10 of GFAP)
In the first years after Dayton, the High Representative hesitated to intervene as a leading authority in matters over which national institutions had competence. This changed after the 1997 Bonn Conference for Implementation of Peace3326 when the representatives of the international community received adequate support for more vigorous and determined activities to implement the peace agreement. Since then the High Representative has relied on an extensive interpretation of his powers under Annex 10 and he has imposed laws, has declared invalid the decisions of lower-instance courts, has forbidden certain persons to hold political office3327or removed officials from office – even those holding office at the highest levels of power. Citizens’ reactions to such actions have varied. The representatives of various elites were also divided in their opinion. Some national officials were even thankful to the High Representative because he assumed the responsibility to make such unpleasant decisions. What is more, they tried to support the activities of the High Representative in such a way as to make their support depend on the High Representative’s interventions against their political opponents.3328 Just before the end of High Representative Petritsch’s era, the protagonists started to attach importance to the transfer of the responsibilities for the peace process implementation to national officials under the motto of “ownership”.3329 This tendency disappeared shortly after Lord Ashdown took office, which was the reason why he was exposed to vicious criticism. The debate on this topic culminated in an article published in the Journal of Democracy3330 in July 2003, in which the author rebuked him for behaving as a liberal colonial leader preventing the development of democratic structures. During the period of Schwarz-Schilling, an attempt to withdraw the High Representative was made in the hope that the political elites would act reasonably after assuming responsibility. This attempt failed and it weakened the OHR, whereupon Lajčák and Inzko were unable to succeed in recovering its lost authority. The fundamental goal of these two High Representatives was to fulfil the conditions to close the OHR.
Footnotes
Fn. 28, p. 25.
So-called vetting; compare with ICG, 2003, p. 32 et seq. 3328 Marko, 2001, p. 74; Knaus/Martin, 2003, p. 68.
As to this change in strategy and an overview of the activities of the High Representative, see: La Ferrara, 2000, p. 191 et seq. Compare also, the High Representative’s speech given before the Steering Board Ministerial Meeting, of 22 September 1999, available at: <www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/presssp/archive. asp> (OHR online press-archive), and the manuscript of the speech of SDHR at the “Ownership Panel” of 3 July 2001 in Konjic (the authors’ archive).
Knaus/Martin, 2003; article and reactions available at: <www.journalofdemocracy. org> and <www.esiweb.org>. Compare also, the author’s summary in FAZ, of 25 July 2003, p. 9, titled “Wohlwollende Despoten” (“Good-Natured Despots”), as well as the reactions and discussions on a particular case of removal from office Michael Martens, “Die Macht der Gewohnheit” (“The Power of Habit”), FAZ of 30.8.2003, p. 3.