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The effect of each agreement should be determined on a case by case basis given that each agreement has its own object and modalities. Two main variables seem to apply for any determination of which elements are being transferred: (1) What does the Constitution allow to be transferred? (2) What does the agreement itself provides?

What is allowed to be transferred? Article III.5(a) could be interpreted as only allowing Entities to transfer to Bosnia and Herzegovina a right to exercise responsibilities rather than the full responsibilities themselves. We tend to disagree with such an interpretation. Our position is mainly motivated by the need to ensure the highest level of stability and coherence in the constitutional system of the allocation of responsibilities. By allowing Entities to revisit the initial allocation of competencies operated by the Constitution, the transfer agreement mechanism foresees a number of ways by which the stability and coherence of this system can be disturbed.2648 It is our view that Article III.5(a) should thus be interpreted in a manner that seeks to protect the coherence and sustainability of the system put in place by the Constitution and should not automatically open the door to arrangements that would introduce irrationality into this system.

Moreover, transfer agreements will often be followed by the adoption of legislation and the establishment of complex administrative structures delivering concrete public services to the population. This in itself argues for a clear constitutional framework allowing the transfer of responsibilities to occur in a rational and coherent manner. In the absence of clear provisions to the contrary in the transfer agreement itself, it is argued that a transfer agreement concluded under Article III.5(a) should be construed as transferring the relevant responsibility as a whole together with all accessory responsibilities required for the exercise of the principal responsibility.2649

What does the agreement itself provide for? As indicated above, Entities may wish to agree to a more restrictive set of arrangements.2650 While the extent to which they are entitled to do so has not been fully clarified yet, the developments in U 14/04 provide a number of preliminary indications. The applicant in this case challenged the constitutionality of laws adopted by the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina relating to responsibilities that had been transferred by Entities in the field of indirect taxation.2651 Following the transfer of such responsibilities, Bosnia and Herzegovina had enacted a Law on Indirect Taxation System in Bosnia Herzegovina (hereinafter: Law on Indirect Taxation)2652 through which it established an Indirect Taxation Authority with a Governing Board (hereinafter Board) composed of the Finance Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Entities as well as three experts. This Board was vested with the authority to give prior approbation to the promulgation or amendment of legislation on indirect taxation to be enacted by the Federation, Republika Srpska or the Brcko District.2653 In more simple terms, the Entities had maintained their capacity to adopt legislation in the field of indirect taxation, but had conditioned their capacity to do so by transferring a right of prior approval to a body established by Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The laws contested by the applicant in this case purported to amend existing legislation from the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina regulating fiscal matters in the field of indirect taxation. Considering that the Board’s approval had neither been sought nor given, the applicant argued that the laws adopted by the Federation were unconstitutional. In an important decision, the Court held that the failure by the Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to obtain the consent of the Board amounted to a violation of Articles III.3(b) and III.5(a) of the Constitution, thus implicitly validating the notion that Entities can transfer less than their whole responsibilities.2654


Footnotes

  1. The Court seems to have recognized the exceptional nature of the transfer agreement mechanism under Article III.3(a) and to have already excluded several possibilities by which responsibilities can be transferred by observing that there is no constitutional basis upon which the exclusive responsibilities of Bosnia and Herzegovina can be transferred to the Entities. See U 11/08, paragraph 21.

  2. Some have argued otherwise in relation to the system of transfering responsibilities set forth under the Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. See, European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Opinion on the Transfer of Responsibility in the Field of Higher Education within the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, (Opinion no. 258/2003), 24 October 2003, paragraph 16. While we agree with the views expressed by the Commission on the need to avoid legal uncertainty, our opinions diverge on the means by which such uncertainty should be avoided.

  3. While the capacity of Entities to do so is not disputed, the extent of such a capacity could be subject to review by the Court. One could well imagine that the Court could, for the reasons outlined above, decide to invalidate certain segments of a transfer agreement should it consider that such segments disturb the overall coherence and sustainability of the system of distribution of responsibilities established by the Constitution.

  4. As indicated above, Entities have transferred certain responsibilities in the field of indirect taxation to Bosnia and Herzegovina through an agreement concluded under Article III.3(a). The agreement is unpublished. See however Decision to Consent to the Agreement on Responsibilities in the Indirect Taxation Area (OG of FBiH, No. 64/03); See also Republika Srpska National Assembly, Conclusions No. 01-1005/03 (OG of RS, No. 95/03).

  5. Law on Indirect Taxation System in BiH (OG of FBiH, Nos. 44/03, 52/04, 34/07, 4/08).

  6. See generally the Law on Indirect Taxation System in BiH (OG of BiH, Nos. 44/03, 52/04, 34/07, 4/08). For the establishment of the Indirect Taxation Authority see, inter alia, Articles 3 to 6. For the Governing Board see, inter alia, Articles 3, 14 to 20. For the system of prior approbation of the Board for the promulgation or amendment of legislation on indirect taxation by the Federation, Republika Srpska or the Brčko District, see Article 25(4).

  7. U 14/04, paragraphs 27-29.

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