ii. Trial within a reasonable time or release from detention
It is required that criminal proceedings involving detained persons be conducted with particular expedition and acceptable reasons should be given for continued detention. The word “or” should not be understood so as to imply that the trial within a reasonable time is an alternative to a release from detention. In any case the extension of a detention measure must be justified.857 The suspect/accused is presumed innocent until a judgment is rendered, so the aim of that principle is, in fact, the submission of a request for temporary release of the suspect/accused if the extension of detention is no longer appropriate.
The reasonableness of the length of detention is related to the whole period of duration of detention, which means not only to the period until the commencement of main trial.858
The reasonableness of the length of detention according to Article 5, paragraph 3 of the ECHR must be distinguished from the reasonableness of the length of proceedings according to Article 6, paragraph 1 of the ECHR. The commencement and the end of detention on the one hand and the length of proceedings on the other need to be distinguished. In both cases reasonableness is assessed according to different criteria. Thus, the length of trial in some cases may be reasonable due to the complexity of the case and that rule does not automatically apply to the extension of detention.859
Time-limits for assessing the reasonableness of the length of detention until adjudication of the matter are related to the time of the deprivation of liberty or the commencement of a detention measure on the one hand and to the time when the decision is taken on the confirmation of indictment on the other. For instance, the commencement of criminal proceedings is not relevant. Accordingly, the detention pending a decision of the appeal panel concerning a legal remedy is not relevant either.860 In the event of a longer detention which had occurred prior to the entry into force of the ECHR (competence ratione temporis, crucial date 14 December 1995),861 that period of detention may, nevertheless, be taken into consideration when assessing the reasonableness of the length of detention after 14 December 1995.862 The continued reasonable suspicion, i.e., the one that existed at the time of the deprivation of liberty, is condicio sine qua non concerning the extension of a detention measure, but after the expiry of a certain period of time it is no longer per se justified because the assessment of this issue may change over time and that is why the authorities must speed up the proceedings.863
The substantive criterion for assessing the reasonableness of the length of detention is, first of all, the complexity of the proceedings.864 Firstly, depending on the complexity of the case, the competent authorities must prove that the speed at which they dealt with the case was appropriate.865 Secondly, in assessing whether the length of detention was appropriate, the courts should examine whether the reasons given by the national authorities are relevant and sufficient to prove that the detention was not extended for an inappropriately long period of time and that this continued detention is not in contravention of Article 5, paragraph 3 of the ECHR.866 Thirdly, the competent authorities must prove that they displayed special diligence in the conduct of the proceedings.867 Fourthly, it should be examined whether the accused contributed to the delays in the proceedings. Fifthly, the state legal system must be functioning so as to provide a quick completion to the proceedings and compliance with the requirements set forth in Article 5, paragraph 3 of the ECHR.868 The state must ensure that the judiciary is structured and equipped properly so that the competent criminal prosecution bodies can fulfil their obligations under Article 6, paragraph 1 and Article 5, paragraph 3 of the ECHR. Possible shortcomings in this regard (such as weaknesses in procedural organisation, poor court staffing capacity, insufficiently precise regulations for replacement of judges being unable to do their job) cannot justify an extremely long detention.869
When it comes to extension of detention, the bodies in charge of criminal proceedings must, while complying with the principle of the presumption of innocence, consider all circumstances for or against the public interest when it comes to a deviation from the rule on the protection of personal freedom and extension of detention. These considerations must be found in a decision (ruling) upon the request for review of detention.870 Extension of detention may be justified in some cases only if there are specific indications of a genuine requirement of public interest which, notwithstanding the presumption of innocence, outweighs the rule of respect for individual liberty.871 The severity of expected sanction cannot justify an extension of detention measure.872 An obligation to carefully examine a detention measure is violated when, for instance, the charge is prevailingly based on the requirement that a perpetrator should to be identified by the witnesses or when the accused is denied his right to confront the witnesses for a long period of time and, at some later point, it turns out that not a single witness was able to identify the perpetrator.873
Footnotes
CH/00/3880-A&M, paragraph 146; CH/01/7488-A&M, paragraph 102.
CH/00/3880-A&M, paragraphs 146, 148, with quotation from the ECtHR, Neumeister v. Austria of 7 May 1974, Series A no. 8, paragraph 4; CH/02/12427-A&M, paragraph 115.
CH/01/7488-A&M, paragraph 103.
CH/01/7912 et al.-A&M, paragraph 154 in relation to the ECtHR, Wemhoff v. Germany of 27 June 1969, Series A no. 7, paragraph 12; CH/00/3880-A&M, paragraph 150.
The reasonableness of the length of detention prior to the entry into force of the Dayton Peace Agreement (14 November1995), due to impossibility to apply the ECHR, is not legally relevant ratione temporis within the meaning of the possibility for its legal assessment. At the moment of expiry of this time-limit a lot of civilians and military were kept in detention although the requirement was not met as to the existence of some justified reason under Article 5, paragraph 1 of the ECHR. After 14 December 1995 those persons, pursuant to Article IX of Annex 1-A to the Dayton Peace Agreement, may be kept in detention for a maximum of 60 days “after the transfer of the authority”. Article IX of Annex1-A to the Dayton Peace Agreement, pursuant to Article 15 of the ECHR, derogated from the obligation under Article 5 of the ECHR in some way (CH/02/10446, paragraph 19 et seq.).
See, CH/00/3880-A&M, paragraph 149 et seq., the quotation from the ECtHR, Kalashnikov v. Russia of 15 July 2002, paragraphs. 110-111.
CH/02/11108 et al.-A&M, paragraph 171, and CH/02/12427-A&M, paragraphs 119 and 124, in relation to the ECtHR, Kemmache v. France of 27 November 1991, Series A no. 218, paragraphs 45 and 52.
CH/02/12427-A&M, paragraph 124; CH/02/11108 et al.-A&M, paragraphs 171, 174; AP 641/03, paragraph 32.
CH/00/3880-A&M, paragraph 151.
In connection with this issue see also “iii. Article 5, paragraph 1(c)”, p. 214, discussing the risk of flight from detention, the risk of hiding and repeating the same offence and the threat to public order and security. See examples in CH/02/11108 et al.-A&M, paragraph 169 et seq.; CH/00/3880-A&M, paragraph 154. See also CH/00/3880- A&M, paragraphs 146, 151, 153 in connection with Wemhoff v. Germany of 27 June 1968, Series A no. 7, paragraphs 10, 12, and Tomasi v. France of 27.8.1992, Series A no. 241-A, paragraph 84; see also CH/01/7912 et al.-A&M, paragraph 156 et seq.; CH/01/7488-A&M, paragraph 104 in relation to the ECtHR, Letellier v. France of 26 June 1991, Series A no. 207.
See the proceedings in the Case CH/00/3880-A&M, which is a sad example of the lack of diligence, in particular paragraph 155, where it is pointed to the fact that the criminal proceedings which were conducted against a detained appellant were being forgotten from time to time.
CH/02/12427, paragraph 134.
See CH/02/11108 et al.-A&M, paragraph 178 et seq.
CH/01/7912 et al.-A&M, paragraph 155 in relation to the ECtHR, Toth v. Austria of 25 November 1991, Series A no. 224, paragraph 67.
CH/00/3880-A&M, paragraph 147, with quotation from the ECtHR, W. v. Switzerland of 26 January 1993, Series A no. 254, paragraph 30; AP 641/03, paragraph 27.
Although the practice appears to be different: see commentary under “iii. Article 5, paragraph 1(c)”, p. 214.
See, CH/01/7488-A&M, paragraph 105.